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I and the Other
Matter and Experience of time in Phenomenology
«That consciousness which is hidden in 
so much flesh and blood is the least intel-
ligible of occult qualities».
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Introduction
In phenomenology, experience is always first-person experience; that is, 
a particular subject’s experience, never that of a general and abstract subject. 
How is it possible, therefore, to account phenomenologically for my experience 
of other people? The problem of how I can experience another I is just that: a 
problem.
What gives itself to my experience is the body of the other. But the other 
is not reducible to that body: in fact, he perceives me and has an experience of 
me which can be considered comparable to the experience I have of him. On 
the other hand, my being seen by the other still belongs to the sphere of what 
is given to me, therefore it does not violate but instead confirms the principle 
according to which every experience is always my experience, first-person expe-
rience. For Husserl, in order to be able to trace in the other’s body, which is part 
of my experience, the presence of another person’s experience, it is necessary to 
clarify how, within my own experience, that “leap” is made which allows the 
emergence, out of an absence, of a latent presence: the presence of otherness.
The problem of how to account for something that is at the same time 
present (I have an experience of the other not as a mere thing but as a person) 
and absent (I cannot have a direct experience of what the other experiences) 
risks falling into aporia at every step.
This is a case of an epistemological aporia, since it is about how it is pos-
sible, from my experience, to grasp the presence of the other. The answers to this 
question, not only in Husserl, but also in Scheler, Levinas, and Sartre, are well 
known. The strategy we shall attempt to undertake here is of an ontological, 
rather than epistemological, type. Indeed, our starting point will not so much be 
I and the Other
411
the impossibility of experiencing the life events of others from the first-person 
experience of my own life events, as the co-participation and reciprocal penetra-
tions, in subjectivity itself, of interiority and exteriority, of subjectivity and ex-
traneity. In the epistemological approach, the other’s inaccessibility is originary 
and needs the activation of a further experience (that of Einfühlung in, or iden-
tification with, the other) if it is to be overcome; in the ontological proposition, 
the interweaving of subjectivity with otherness is given in an equally originary 
and evident way in the notion of embodiment, or living matter.
In this paper I will try to show how the problem of solipsism may be attrib-
uted to a particular way of understanding the notion of materiality and how the 
solving of this problem would therefore involve the retracing of a more original 
problem of matter.
1. Matter as residue
If we confine ourselves to so-called static phenomenology, there are three 
accepted meanings of the term “matter”: 1. matter as feeling, or material hyle; 
2. matter as perceived content or material property; 3. inanimate or physical 
matter. The first two meanings have to do with organic matter, the third with 
inorganic matter. The problem of the sensorial hyle arises as the consequence of 
a distinction, clearly present in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, although pro-
gressively vaguer and more fluid, between intentional experience and hyletic or 
phenomenal experience. Consciousness is essentially, though not exclusively, in-
tentional consciousness. Conceiving of intentionality as the property that char-
acterizes phenomenological consciousness means placing intentional activity at 
the center of subjectivity. The object is always grasped from a certain perspec-
tive, or from a certain point of view; which in concrete terms means isolating a 
certain cluster or kernel of determinations. In fact, the partiality of the point of 
view stamped by intentional consciousness on the object is, in the final analysis, 
attributable to the particular totality of determinations offered by the noetic 
structure, and any variation in a given point of view is in turn attributable to 
variation in a given totality. In the end, phenomenological constitution resides 
in this determinative process.
To sum up: in so-called static phenomenology, the essence of subjectivity 
is attributable to its capacity for representation, and the essence of representa-
tion is in turn attributable to concept of determination. The aim of the subject’s 
intentional or constitutive activity consists in determining the object of experi-
ence, tracing – so to speak – its perimeter or profile.
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Nevertheless, as is well known, the intentional or representational func-
tion does not exhaust the concept of subjectivity. For Husserl, unlike Brentano, 
not all states of consciousness are intentional. What there is in addition is feel-
ing, or material hyle; and the latter in turn ends up as a residue of the intentional 
structure or framework.
The distinction between the formal (essential) dimension and the mate-
rial (additional, residual) dimension of subjectivity, present in so-called static 
phenomenology, places the problem of the conjunction between the hyletic (or 
material) and intentional (or functional) dimensions. From this point of view, 
the very concept of replenishment is not a solution but the name of a problem: 
that is, the problem of the conjunction between two contents; the phenomenal 
(material) content and the cognitive-representational (structural) content1.
We now come to the second meaning of matter, the one that relates to 
the perceived object. The distinction between intentional (essential) structure 
and material (inessential) hyle is in fact reflected, on the noematic level, in the 
distinction between extension and plena. Just as the purpose of the material hyle 
is to replenish an empty intentional structure, so the purpose of the plena will 
be that of qualifying an extension which is not in itself qualified by the senses. 
In addition, the relationship between extension and plena, like the relationship 
between intentional structure and material hyle, is characterized by the priority 
accorded to the (empty) functional dimension over the (full) material dimen-
sion. Moreover, like intention, extension is an essential (although not defining) 
characteristic of the material object when faced with the inessentiality of quali-
fication by the senses. If the function of the material hyle is that of replenishing 
an empty intentional structure, without which action would lose its own direc-
tionality; the function of the plena is that of replenishing an empty extension 
without which the phenomenon would be destined to lose its own boundaries, 
thereby frustrating its own status as a datum.
The static (noetic and noematic) view of matter seems to lead to a sort of 
“phenomenological functionalism”, a consequence of what I shall henceforth 
1 The focus on the point of contact, on the conjunction between an authentic cognitive (formal, 
structural, expressible) dimension and immediate (material, momentary, unarticulated, unexpressed) 
experience, constitutes a problem which similarly seems destined to remained unsolved in spheres other 
than the phenomenological: think of the problems of the qualia or “what it is like to be” in philosophy 
of mind; or the problem of the status of observable terms in the epistemological sphere and, lastly, the 
debate about the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content in the philosophy of lan-
guage. In this sense, the relation between material hyle and intentional structure represents merely the 
latest incarnation of the same problem, which consists in clarifying the epistemological nature of the 
impact of the experiential dimension on the conceptual framework.
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call logic of the residue. This expression indicates what in epistemology is termed 
a paradigmatic assumption. In this specific case, the assumption consists in priv-
ileging the formal (indeed, functional) dimension over the material (pathic) 
dimension, which is affective on the one hand, and qualitative on the other. 
Such a paradigmatic arrangement allows us to obtain two outcomes.
On the noetic level, it allows reflection to perform its essential task, that of 
rendering experiences as objects. The formal aspect of the act of consciousness 
in fact allows reflection to exercise the necessary “distance”, that distance which, 
for example, allows reflection on a perceptual intention and which seems pre-
cluded in the case of pain, as of any other sensation. On the noematic level, the 
distinction between extension and plena offers the possibility of identifying the 
boundaries within which givenness displays itself, or appears, and of being able 
to exercise that “fragmentation” acknowledged by Husserl as fundamental for 
the definition of the object.
«There belongs to the essence of extension the ideal possibility of fragmen-
tation. It is then evident that every fragmentation of the extension fragments 
the thing itself – i.e., splits it into pieces, each of which once again has the full 
thingly character, that of material thingness»2.
Conceiving of the object as a synholos of (essential) extension and (ines-
sential) filling qualities or plena, or in other words maintaining the thesis of the 
ontological priority of extension in the constitution of the sensible, material 
thing, constitutes the antechamber of that “compositional” which has widely 
been seen (Bergson, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) as characterizing the “scientific 
image” and, most particularly, the project of physicalizing experience.
What seems to be shared by the static conception of phenomenology and 
this project is in the first place the centrality of the notion of determination 
and, in the second place, the distinction between essential determinations (ex-
tension) and inessential determinations (the patina or qualitative veil), which 
serve to fill the former:
«In particular, each thing is different, each may have its different spatial 
extension and fill it qualitatively in a very different manner. [...] It must be 
said of every kind of quality that it may have its own special ways of filling 
spatial corporeality, covering it, extending itself over it. Yet it is necessarily a 
quality that fills. The thing knows no other extensive determinations besides 
2 E. Hussserl, Ideas Pertaining a pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of constitution, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989 (1912-29), p. 33.
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pure corporeality (the primary quality) and the modifying sensuous quali-
ties, the “qualifying” secondary qualities. [...] The thing is what it is in its real 
properties, but each one, taken separately, is not necessary in the same sense. 
Each is a ray of the thing’s being. But corporeal extension is not a ray of real 
being in that same sense; it is not in the same way (properly speaking, “in no 
way”) a real property. Rather, it is an essential form of all real properties»3.
The conception expressed by Husserl is, once again, residual. In this case, 
it is a question of a residue relative to extension in space. In the foundational re-
lationship between extension and plena, and in the consequent constitution of 
an independent part, this latter part inherits from extension the fragmentabil-
ity which the plena would not have of themselves (one cannot, for example, 
fragment red) and this, once again, is further proof of the fact that extension 
is primary and foundational. On more than one occasion Husserl refers to the 
intuitive properties as a patina or veil that covers an extension, thereby offering 
it qualification. We can push this so far as to say that for Husserl the plena are 
indeed fundamental (we would otherwise not have full phenomena, but only 
empty phantoms of phenomena), and yet not essential: in fact, it is extension, 
and only extension, that is actually essential. If the function of the material hyle 
is that of filling an empty intentional structure – without which the action 
would lose its directionality – the function of the plena is that of filling an ex-
tension without which the phenomenon would be destined to lose its own con-
tours, its own perimetrization, thereby frustrating its own phenomenal nature.
In conclusion, there are two theses emerging from the static analysis of the 
notion of matter: the first is the essentiality, or priority, of the morphological-
structural or cognitive-representational aspect; the (complementary) second 
is the residual or secondary status of the material, hyletic, pathic or affective 
dimension.
If, on the one hand, identifying the essential component of consciousness 
in its formal framework and the essential component of the object understood 
in its extension allows the possibility of (noetic) distance and (noematic) frag-
mentation, on the other hand it is responsible for a sort of “closure”, both of 
consciousness and of the objects towards which consciousness is directed from 
time to time.
In fact, to declare the material aspect (in its double sense of hyle and ple-
na) to be residual in relation to the functional dimension, means conceiving of 
consciousness as a sort of projector, and the object of consciousness as a sort 
3 Ibi, p. 34.
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of map. The purpose of both is to provide boundaries: boundaries established 
by intentional activity in the case of consciousness; boundaries determined by 
extension in the case of the object. Many phenomenological notions – for ex-
ample those of field, region, stratum, perspective, synthesis, pole – are, not by 
chance, geographical in their derivation and use. By means of these notions and 
the philosophical posture that underlies them, consciousness is transformed 
into thought, or into cogito, and the world is transformed into thought world, 
or noema. Now the residual conception of matter (in its dual guise as essential-
ity of the intentional structure on the noetic level and essentiality of extension 
on the noematic level) can be called drastically into question. On the noematic 
front, it is possible to place the emphasis less on the notion of determination 
than on fluid and dynamic concepts such as resistance, tension, force, thrust, 
power, which allow us to overcome the concept of the object as a sensibly quali-
fied, extended map.
For our present purposes, it is more interesting to consider the noetic as-
pect of the matter.
In our opinion, the problem of solipsistic closure is, in fact, connected 
to the priority afforded to the formal component over the material and to the 
consequent reduction of subjective activity to projective activity. The so-called 
conceptual problem of other minds underlies a systematization of this kind.
If my self-experience is of a purely mental nature, what should guaran-
tee the ascriptions of the same states to others? The proper way to respond to 
this challenge is by considering subjectivity to be essentially embodied. Which 
means recognizing the inherence between mind and matter, rather than mat-
ter’s residual character; their intertwining rather than their distinctness from 
each other; immersion in a body rather than reflexive distance.
This distance is in fact inhibited by the essentially embodied character 
of subjectivity and by the reversibility (noted also by Husserl, as well as by 
Merleau-Ponty) which characterizes the Leib: my own bodily self-experience is 
characterized by an interplay between ipseity and alterity: «when my left hand 
touches my right, or when I perceive another part of my body, I am experienc-
ing myself in a manner that anticipates both the way in which an other would 
experience me and the way in which I would experience an other»4. For Mer-
leau-Ponty, in a yet more explicit way, the self-experience of subjectivity must 
contain a dimension of otherness.
4 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective, mit Press, 
Cambridge 2005, p. 157.
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«Unless I learn within myself to recognize the junction of the for itself and 
in itself, none of those mechanisms called other bodies will be able to come 
to life; unless I have an exterior, others have no interior. The plurality of con-
sciousness is impossible if I have an absolute consciousness of myself»5.
From the embodied and embedded character of self-experience derives the 
impossibility of making the Ego in its entirety an object of reflection («I am 
not transparent for myself»)6. The admission of this impossibility is what al-
lows Merleau-Ponty to assert, heretically for a classical phenomenologist, that 
«the self-perception is still a perception, i.e. it gives me a Nicht Urpräsentierbar 
(a non-visible, myself )»7. Therefore, even before the Other, it is the Ego that 
is originally un-presentable. In this sense, the Ego as Leib, turns out to be as 
impenetrable to itself as is the alter ego.
«I can see my eyes in three mirrors, but they are the eyes of someone 
observing»8: from this point of view both Ego and Alter ego present themselves 
to me for reflection in the form of Körper, which means that, given the originary 
unpresentability of the self to reflection, the demarcation between ego and alter 
ego becomes markedly re-configured. According to Merleau-Ponty, «I can ex-
perience others because I’m never so close to myself that the other is completely 
and radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself 
and, therefore, open to others»9. The eye is the point of visibility, its ground 
zero, the opening of the visible which nevertheless cannot itself be seen. Pick-
ing up once again the metaphor of projection, we are dark to ourselves, and yet 
this darkness is precisely «the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the 
performance»10.
2. Giving too much weight to the present
As is well known, the pervasiveness of the metaphors of projection and 
map, together with the objectifying power of reflection, becomes radically re-
configured in so-called genetic phenomenology. Indeed in the genetic approach 
5 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, Routledge, London 1962 (1945), p. 373.
6 Ibi, p. 352.
7 M. Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 
1968 (1964), p. 249.
8 Ibi, p. 105.
9 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective, cit., p. 161.
10 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 115.
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both the “awakened” subjectivity and the understood object, by virtue of being 
understood, become evanescent thanks to the decisive role played by temporal-
ity. This last is not added as if it were extrinsic to contents of consciousness or to 
objects complete in themselves but becomes the tacit factor which permits the 
constitution, in a passive manner, of every object. Consciousness, according to 
this conception, is not in time, but is itself time. The auto-constitutive dynam-
ics of the materials of experience place a limit on that primacy of the functional 
dimension which characterizes static phenomenology. From the genetic point 
of view, we are not concerned with entities complete unto themselves, whether 
they be states of consciousness or understood objects: «every actually present 
now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes 
into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed con-
tinuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for 
every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum»11.
There is no datum of consciousness except insofar as it is temporal and, 
more generally, there is no reality except insofar as it is temporal. Thus time be-
comes the first and fundamental factor in the constitution of objects, precisely 
by virtue of the dynamics which bring into play the hyletic contents considered 
in their dimension as primary sources (ursprüngliche). If these contents are no 
longer chaotic material to be shaped by means of an active intentional act, the 
schema of apprehension-apprehensional content passes away, as does the more 
general schema of form-matter. Every temporal constituent, given the impossi-
bility of distinguishing between the dimensions of content-matter and formal-
temporal, becomes an interweaving of matter and form.
The introduction of temporality seems capable of dismantling the very 
closure of static phenomenology, and hence of reconfiguring the problem of 
solipsism. Both matter understood as material hyle and matter as plenum, in-
sofar as they are endowed with an autonomous temporal structure, offer the 
subject that opening which is absent from static phenomenology. Explicit acts 
of apprehension (Auffassungen) or awarenesses in fact now emerge from the dy-
namics within the hyletico-material contents and are attributable to them. This 
attribution allows consciousness to blur its own outlines in favor of a continu-
ous process of transfusion of one material content into another. Nevertheless, 
there remains one aspect to which it is worth our while paying attention. Al-
though it has been released from an “extractable” form, the temporal structure 
that characterizes genetic phenomenology is nevertheless rooted in an originary 
11 E. Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of the internal Time, Kluwer, 
Dordrecht 1991 (1893-1917), vol. iv, p. 88.
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impression (Ur-impression or Ur-empfindung). Although it has been stripped of 
any reference to an explicit activity of consciousness, just as it has of any return 
to a possible “inside” or “outside”, the point “now”, or the present available to 
impression, constitutes the epicenter from which retentions (the past) are held 
back and by which protensions (the future) are oriented. The endurance or dis-
appearance of hyletic contents is conditional upon their progressive remoteness 
from the impressional purity in relation to which these contents are retentions 
or protensions.
Phenomenological consciousness, however much it lacks outlines drawn 
by the distinction between form and matter, is nevertheless always a conscious-
ness rooted in the present. We shall see shortly how this exclusive rootedness 
once again exposes phenomenology to the risk of solipsism.
For Husserl, there is no reality that is not temporal: that is, in relation to a 
consciousness that lasts. This means introducing the essential factor of memory 
and the relationship between memory and perception. For Husserl, as for Berg-
son, memory is not a simple placing of past data into some “drawer” or “log 
book” of our consciousness. Nor, on the other hand, is perception a purely mo-
mentary state, a source of data which, then slipping into the memory, would lit-
tle by little be eclipsed by the horizon of consciousness. Perception is not mere 
immediacy, not purely current consciousness, but an action that entails a certain 
duration. This means that every current “now” is incessantly transformed into a 
retention, leading to a continuum in which every successive moment is a reten-
tion of every preceding moment; a sort of comet whose tail is composed of the 
“trail” or indistinct halo of retentions12. The comet’s tail is what provides the 
originary impression (the present) with the adumbrations (Abschattungen) it 
needs: every lasting actuality is thus perceived distinctly in the originary im-
pression, before flowing on into retention until it becomes blurred and finally 
plunges into the past.
For Husserl «the primal impression is the absolute beginning of this pro-
duction, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously pro-
duced. But it itself is not produced: it does not arise as something produced but 
through genesis spontanea; it is primal generation [...]. It can only be said: Con-
sciousness is nothing without impression»13; and so-called adequate percep-
tion is the continuous passage, in consciousness, of the present into retention; a 
passing which, in the perception of the now (the head of the comet), finds that 
12 The image of the comet is Husserl’s own «But this now apprehension is, as it were, the head 
attached to the comet’s tail of retentions relating to the earlier now-points of the motion» (ibi, p. 89). 
13 Ibi, p. 163.
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absolute “source” which permits the continuous, unitary and indivisible passage 
made possible by the retention exercised by the retentional consciousness14. If 
it is true that in lived time every now-point always and necessarily turns out to 
be mediated by its own retentional trail, it is also true that there is no retention 
that is not rooted in a now, exactly as no tail can be anything other than the trail 
from the head of a comet.
The originary impression, the present, the now, are the necessary fulcrum 
without which duration cannot unfold. In doing this, Husserl once more identi-
fies a form, in this case a temporal form. This is a linear or horizontal continuity 
between retention, originary impression and protension, which unfolds ideally 
(and metaphorically) on a “surface”, a swimming in the temporal current, mov-
ing through its whole extension exactly as a swimmer would do.
By means of the priority afforded to presentness or to the “awakened” con-
sciousness (and to the consequent subordination of retention and protension: 
“every retention is always preceded by an impression”) temporal analysis ratifies 
the isolation of the subject before its own object, exemplifying once again the 
problem of solipsism.
3. Living matter
A first step towards the overcoming of solipsism may be traced in a new 
conception of matter. As we have seen, the static model predicts the distinc-
tion between a formal component and a material one. On the noetic level, 
this distinction is realized in the binomial of intentional or representational 
(essential) structure and material (residual) hyle; on the noematic level in the 
binomial of (essential) extension and (residual) plena. Matter will thus pres-
ent itself, à la Descartes, as “something more” in relation to the essentiality of 
the dimension that is formal, projective, representational on the one hand and 
extensive on the other.
From this perspective the notion of map becomes crucial in exposing 
phenomenology to the risk of solipsism: considering form as essential in fact 
14 Which determines the difference between retention and memorization, due to their different 
relationships with perception: the former is structurally in continuity with it, while the latter arises 
when perception quits the scene. Moreover, memorization (or secondary memory) is free (although 
dependant on perception), while retention can only occur because there is a perception. We do 
not decide to perceive something, we simply do it. In the end, retention is primary: if there were no 
perception and retention there would in fact be nothing to remember.
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“closes” subjectivity in the egological circle of its own representations and of the 
inevitable partiality of its own points of view.
A possible way of avoiding this consequence may be identified in a differ-
ent conception of matter, a conception which gives priority on the one hand to 
the hyletic, pathic, affective dimension and on the other to the dimension of 
the plenum15.
Feeling and flesh, both fundamental notions in Merleau-Ponty, reflect the 
attempt to overcome the gnoseological and ontological predominance of closed 
notions such as those of projection and map in favor of open notions like those 
of intertwining, chiasmus, reversibility between internal and external. Feeling 
will now be understood not as possessing inert qualities, and still less as a mere 
response to external stimuli, but as a vital process or rhythm, that rhythm which 
we can retrace in procreation, respiration and growth. For its own part, flesh 
will no longer be mere thing, extension covered by determined qualities, but liv-
ing matter, “inwardly tormented”, in which the word “alive” does not function 
as a predicate – that is, it does not denote a property or characteristic of matter 
– but rather corresponds to one a modification of it.
From this point of view, it becomes problematic to speak of qualia, as we 
still tend to do in philosophy of mind. The quale, understood as a phenom-
enal or qualitative determination or patina becomes estranged from the vital 
operations involved in perception, thereby contributing to that flattening and 
evening out of the subjective experience.
«There are two ways of being mistaken about quality: one is [...] to treat it as 
an incommunicable impression, whereas it always has a meaning; the other 
is to think that this meaning and this object, at the level of quality, are fully 
developed and determinate»16.
We could say that feeling, and the embodied thought it underlies, have a 
thickness that neither the Husserlian notion of plena nor the notion of qualia in 
philosophy of mind have managed to grasp. But in order to be capable of real-
izing this thickness, notions such as those of feeling and flesh but, almost para-
doxically, achieve a sort of opacity and impersonality extraneous to the egological 
perspective and to the distinction between internal and external. Immanence is 
no longer read as an “internal sphere”, a “dwelling” in which the individual finds 
15 This will lead to a different conception of inanimate matter itself, centred not on notions like 
those of extension, impenetrability, solidity (which all derive from a spatial conception of matter itself), 
but on dynamic notions like those of resistance, force, etc.
16 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 56.
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himself “encapsulated”. It is, on the contrary, translated as “being in the world”, 
in proximity to it, and therefore as being in some way already external.
«So, if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to 
say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive. [...] Between my sensa-
tion and myself there stands always the thickness of some primal acquisition 
which prevents my experience from being clear of itself. I experience the sen-
sation as a modality of a general existence, one already destined for a physical 
world and which runs through me without my being the cause of it»17.
Even before representing the world, consciousness makes itself the world 
and does so by means of the body: the body understood not so much as a kines-
thetic body with essentially constitutive tasks, and not even as a bodily scheme, 
but as a dimension in large part autonomous, bearer of a latent and not explicit 
knowledge, with regard to which notions of background and horizon play a 
crucially important part.
Flesh is not bodily extension endowed with kinesthetic movement, but 
originary experience of immersion in the world. It is founded on the reversibil-
ity between sensing and sensible: that is, on the apprehension of what we con-
sider “external” as the reverse of what we consider “internal”; exactly «as if space 
had taken to knowing itself interiorly»18. By means of it, we do not understand 
something, but something “is understood in me”.
The constant use of the impersonal form (“is thought in me”, “is perceived 
in me,” etc.) indicates a new opening up of phenomenology to an ontology of 
the trans-individual or the inter-corporeal. Every one of our perceptions or 
thoughts or movements in the world engages with a network of relationships 
which contribute to the establishment of a sort of “sensorium commune”. And 
this has sensation as its starting point: «I am no more aware of being the true 
subject of my sensation than of my birth or my death»19; the sensation «is an-
terior to myself, it arises from sensibility which has preceded it and which will 
outlive it, just as my birth and death belong to a natality and a mortality which 
are anonymous»20. Our whole experience therefore engages with a general flux 
which «runs through me without my being the cause of it»21, which does in-
17 Ibi, pp. 150-151.
18 M. Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, cit., p. 75.
19 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 250.




deed mean that I am nothing but a «certain rhythm of existence»22. This is es-
pecially evident in the relationship between the newborn infant and its mother, 
characterized by a sort of fleshly intersubjectivity. The communication between 
mother and child is guided by rules that we could describe as circular, like re-
versibility and transitivism: the infant wants the mother to comfort it when it 
suffers pain, and cries so that we could say that it pains the mother in the same 
way as it is pained by stomach ache.
Conceiving of perception not as a personal act but as an impersonal fabric 
in which other beings are nothing but “variants of ourselves” radically changes 
the phenomenological perspective. This new perspective shifts from the per-
sonal to the impersonal, from the solipsistic to the relational: all beings consti-
tute themselves reciprocally from the starting point of a common flesh, from 
matter that is expressive in itself.
The relationship between living body and world is not therefore one 
of mere proximity, but of implication – in the sense that the former lives in a 
space that is, so to speak, oriented – or of situation: «bodily space can be dis-
tinguished from external space and envelop its parts instead of spreading them 
out»23; «and his body is the potentiality of a certain world»24, in the sense that 
its movement does not place the world, but crosses it.
Sensation, body, and movement are closely correlated terms. By means of 
sensation, the body and movement set up that «taking up of external by inter-
nal and of internal by external»25, that is, the circularity, inherence, reversibility 
between internal and external that is able to extend and open the subjective di-
mension to what had, up until that moment, simply been considered other than 
itself. Sensations are not sensory contents, «but a modification of my body»26 
that is, symbioses, ways of penetrating into the external environment, which un-
derlie «a ‘primary layer’ of sense experience which precedes its division among 
the separate senses»27. In this sense it is legitimate to say that «sensation is liter-
ally a form of communion»28.
22 Ibi, p. 248.
23 Ibi, p. 115.
24 Ibi, p. 122.
25 Ibi, p. 153.
26 Ibi, p. 379.
27 Ibi, p. 264. From which derives Merleau-Ponty’s very detailed treatment of the phenomenon of 
synesthesia (for example, pp. 246 ff).
28 Ibi, p. 246.
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4. Giving more value to the past than to the present
Placing the emphasis on the impersonal and anonymous that live in us, and 
considering matter as expressive in itself are two sides of the same coin. Both 
approaches in fact lead to the same result: that of reconfiguring the centrality of 
the notion of person, or of closed subjectivity, in favor of the story in relation to 
which individuality emerges and is realized.
Our entire experience inserts itself into a general flux runs through me 
without my being the cause of it. Consciousness itself thereby becomes an event 
twinned at birth with the world, involving in this process of differentiation 
both the natural temporal horizons that constitute its phylo- and onto-genetic 
evolution, and the cultural horizons into which it has been inserted. From this 
point of view, consciousness belongs to the individual to the same degree as it 
belongs to the surrounding world, and not only to that which is specifically 
human, but also the animal, vegetable and mineral worlds. All beings are “vari-
ants of ourselves”, since they emerge from that soil in relation to which family 
lines emerge as nodes, joints, nerves; or as essences, although this term has now 
taken on a profoundly different connotation. Insofar as they are embodied and 
temporal, essences in fact arise from beneath, or from the depths, depths from 
which individual emerge through differentiation.
«Every ideation is borne by this tree of my duration and other durations, 
this unknown sap nourishes the transparency of the idea; behind the idea, 
there is the unity, the simultaneity of all the real and possible durations, the 
cohesion of one sole Being from one end to the other»29.
This means replacing the notion of the pre-categorical, which refers to a 
horizontal and linear conception, with the notion of the sub-categorical which 
implies a vertical and interwoven conception. The former, wholly founded on 
the present, sets loose that very present into a flow made up of retentions and 
protensions, whereas the ontological priority of the past is the starting point for 
the latter, which considers the individual or existential present as an opening or 
dehiscence. We are a gap, a crack, or a fold «since perception is the ‘flaw’ in this 
‘great diamond»30. In this sense (contra Descartes), perception is not something 
more but, paradoxically in certain respects, something less. Passivity is not a po-
29 M. Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, cit., p. 111.
30 Ibi, p. 241.
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sition of passivity but latency, pre-personal consciousness, a motor dimension 
already present in sensation.
«Generally speaking, red and yellow favour abduction, blue and green ab-
duction. Now, on the whole, the significance of abduction is that the organi-
sm turns towards the stimulus and is attracted by the world – of abduction 
that it turns away from the stimulus and withdraws towards its centre. Sensa-
tions, ‘sensible qualities’ are then far from being reducible to a certain inde-
scribable state or quale; they present themselves with a motor physiognomy, 
and are enveloped in a living significance»31.
The perceptual and motor (hence behavioral) aspects are closely corre-
lated. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty makes himself a spokesman, well in advance, 
for what will be the criticism of the Representational Theory of Mind32 in favor 
of an Embodied Theory of Mind which, as is well known, considers affective 
cognition not as instantiated “internally” by the brain or by internal informa-
tion processing only, but realized by the embodied and embedded organism in 
interaction with the environment, according to schemes studied by the Senso-
rimotor Theory of perception33 and by the Enactive Theory34. The common 
starting point among these views rests on the idea that motor, sensory and af-
fective processes are integrated with each other, foregrounding action, which 
«joins mind and body, or more precisely, it deconstructs the artificial divide 
between inner and outer»35. But what is noted here is the intervention of a 
further decisive factor: the perceptual aspect and the motor – hence, behavioral 
– aspect are closely correlated and are both connected to temporality or, rather, 
to a certain way of understanding temporality. In fact, on closer inspection the 
notions of inhabiting, inhering, entailing and, above all, the notions of body 
and movement, have an essentially temporal structure: «This anonymous life is 
31 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 143.
32 See J. Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational 
Psychology, mit Press, Cambridge ma 2000; R. Millikan, Language, thought, and other biological 
categories: New foundations for realism, mit Press, Cambridge ma 1984.
33 See A. Noë, Vision and mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009 and J.K. O’Regan, 
Sensorimotor approach to (phenomenal) consciousness, in T. Baynes - A. Cleeremans - P. Wilke (eds.), 
The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 588-593.
34 See F. Varela - E. Thompson - E. Rosch, The embodied mind. Cognitive sciences and human 
experience, mit Press, Massachusetts 1991; E. Thompson, Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and 
the sciences of mind, Harvard University Press, Harvard 2010 and E. Thompson - F. Varela, Radical 
Embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness, in «Trends in Cognitive Science» 5, 10(2001), 
pp. 418-425.
35 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective, cit., p. 161.
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merely the extreme form of that temporal dispersal which constantly threatens 
the historical present»36. In this sense, the bodily dimension is closely connect-
ed to memory, since « our body is not primarily in space: it is of it»37. Husserl 
makes a distinction between retention (or primary recollection), indispensible 
for perception, and memorization (or secondary recollection) as a form of free 
memory, though not independent of perception. This is a matter of two differ-
ent types of action, of which the latter (memorization) constitutes the repro-
ductive modification of the former (retention). Both belong to the immanence 
of temporal consciousness, which can pass, as it were, “horizontally” from one 
to the other while remaining always on the same plane: the plane of the singular 
flow of consciousness. It is nevertheless possible to conceive of memory in a 
sense that we could call “vertical”; that is, no longer as an intentional act, but 
as survival, to a large extent impersonal, of past images. On this point, Berg-
son distinguishes between spontaneous memory, which lies in the depth of con-
sciousness and records all the events of our entire lives, and automatic memory, 
which extracts the images from the complex of recollections provided by the 
former – recollections useful for the effective completion of the action sketched 
out by a current perception, but in a completely different way. In order to de-
scribe them, the use of the impersonal once again comes to our aid: we could in 
fact say that, by means of memory, it is recollected in me. Thus, impersonal time 
“bridles” personal time through the body: «as an advent of the impersonal, re-
pression is a universal phenomenon, revealing our condition as incarnate beings 
by relating it to the temporal structure of being in the world»38. In this sense, 
we can say that our body is our own past. This is a past concerned less with 
recollection than with repression. Recollection «spreads out in front of us, like 
a picture, a former experience, whereas this past which remains our true pres-
ent does not leave us but remains constantly hidden behind our gaze instead of 
being displayed before it»39, while, due to the temporal structure of our experi-
ence, every present is capable of «re-integrating into personal existence even 
that past of all pasts which the stereotyped patterns of our organic behaviour 
seem to suggest as being at the origin of our volitional being»40.
Thus, while for Husserl the temporal object deteriorates or collapses, start-
ing from a currently perceived now-point in a past that is always further from 
36 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 404.
37 Ibi, p. 171.
38 Ibi, p. 96.
39 Ibidem.
40 Ibi, p. 98.
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the awakened consciousness, for Bergson the “past” is not characterized by a 
progressive distancing from the “now” of perception, but on the contrary by 
a prolongation of perception towards presentness. The relationship between 
past and present is therefore not a holding back, and still less a collapse, but 
an advance, an authentic “progress”: we could say that, rather than receding, 
memory advances from the past to the present. To sum up, memory is not a dis-
tancing of the impressional present but, on the contrary, a movement towards 
the perceptual present in which the plane of the past’s virtuality is transformed 
into that of the reality of action. In both cases perception is the foundation 
of temporal movement, and yet this movement has entirely complementary 
directions: in one case the present collapses into the past, while in the other the 
past advances into the present.
«My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling 
with the duration which it accumulates: it goes on increasing rolling upon 
itself, as a snowball on the snow [...] Duration is the continuous progress of 
the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as 
the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation. 
Memory [...] is not a faculty of putting away recollections in a drawer, or 
of inscribing them in a register. There is no register, no drawer; there is not 
even, properly speaking, a faculty, for a faculty works intermittently, when 
it will or when it can, whilst the piling up of the past upon the past goes on 
without relaxation. In reality, the past is preserved by itself, automatically. In 
its entirety, probably, it follows us at every instant [...] Our past, then, as a 
whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, 
although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea»41.
If we now extend the outcomes of memory, considering also the latent rec-
ollections present in the deepest layer of consciousness, it becomes simpler to 
understand in what sense in the second case the individual, precisely because 
she participates in a long collective story, lives in an ontological dimension that 
becomes open after having been closed. The individual can now be read as come 
«the suturation of my phenomenal body on to the primordial world»42 and her 
perception as inherence in things, and therefore as an event that participates in a 
common environment.
41 H. Bergson, The creative evolution, The Modern Library, New York 1941 (1911), pp. 7-8.
42 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 408.
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It is more appropriate to refer, not to an intentional direction, but to an 
«intentional arc»43, an arc which «which projects round about us our past, our 
future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation»44 and 
in so doing enables an opening up to the world-environment that it would be re-
ductive to call intersubjective precisely because it is opaque, anonymous and im-
personal: «consciousness discovers in itself [...] the opacity of a primary past»45; 
and by virtue of its very opacity it opens itself to something other than itself.
5. What alterity?
The theme of the impersonal reconfigures the idea of an “internal”, “closed”, 
“isolated” subjectivity. Asserting that the Self is founded on an anonymous and 
impersonal existence, on a pre-reflexive and sub-categorical dimension puts into 
question the independence of the egological structure. As we have already said, 
there are essentially two factors that can urge phenomenological description of 
subjectivity towards closure and isolation: the first is the consideration of the 
“empty” (projection – that is, the intentional-representational framework – on 
the noetic level; the map – that is, extension – on the noematic level) as having 
priority over the “full” (affective, or pathic, consciousness on the noetic level; 
the plena on the noematic level); the second is the consideration of the present, 
or current actuality – that is, impressional consciousness – as the root of the 
inactual – that is, of the past and future, or of retention and protension. The 
metaphors of map and now-point, or of originary impression, in fact contribute 
to that idealization of the ego (the ego as pole, or identificatory synthesis, of 
experiences) which is the ante-room of solipsism.
Reflection on the relationship between myself and the other must there-
fore start from an originary and equidistant dimension. However, this recogni-
tion can be understood in two ways.
According to the first, which we shall call epistemic, the experience of 
otherness is already present in the fact that I and others in fact share the same 
world: if subjectivity and world are related, and if the world contains an essen-
tial reference to others, then subjectivity must necessarily share something with 
alterity and reversibility. The epistemic thesis of alterity is open to certain reser-
vations: maintaining that the difference between self and other derives from, or 
43 Ibi, p. 157.
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibi, p. 408.
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is founded on, an anonymous, shared, undifferentiated dimension, does not in 
the least solve the problem of intersubjectivity.
«To speak of a fundamental anonymity prior to any distinction between 
self and other obscures what must be clarified, namely intersubjectivity un-
derstood as a relation between subjects. Properly speaking, it does not sol-
ve the problem of intersubjectivity, but dissolves it. On the level of radical 
anonymity there is neither individuation nor selfhood; but there is also no 
differentiation, alterity, or transcendence, and there is, consequently, room 
for neither subjectivity nor intersubjectivity»46.
Therefore it remains hard to understand how the individuality of the Self 
can emerge from the impersonal dimension.
Nevertheless, there is a second way of understand this originary dimen-
sion, a way that we shall call ontological (and not ontic), since it does not so 
much refer to the experience of alterity as to alterity as a largely unconscious 
condition, tacit, sub-categorical. So if, in one case, alterity comes back into my 
sphere of consciousness, in the other alterity departs from it. In the latter case, 
that originary level is in fact expressed in a past which, so to speak, preserves 
itself by taking on a variety of forms: within the mechanisms of habit, in the 
motor activity of being alive, in behavior understood as bodily expression. Not 
the abused concept of behavior as response to an external stimulus, but behavior 
as a progressive process of differentiation and individuation. It is by means of 
the break in her own integral experience that the child gradually learns to dis-
tinguish between different living bodies, only one of which has first-person sen-
sations. Thus the child understands, precisely through her behavior (when, for 
example, after a fall she doesn’t see other people showing signs of pain), that she 
cannot live the other’s experience and learns that likewise the other cannot live 
her experiences. Thus it becomes possible to pass from something that is simply 
“there” for the entire system to something that is only there for a part of the 
system: that is, exactly for her own body. Our record memory is rooted in habit 
memory, which lives in the somatic depths and creates that motor response, 
or action, which insinuates itself as difference into the materially real. In this 
sense, opening up subjectivity to alterity entails, in the first place, conceiving 
of feeling not as an isolated sensation – still less as a sensible datum or property 
– but as closely connected to affectivity and motility: that is, as having a «mo-
46 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, cit., p. 170.
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tor physiognomy»47. The flattening of experience in which «the living body 
became an exterior without interior, subjectivity became an interior without 
exterior» is now replaced by the proposal of a «certain rhythm of existence»48. 
This is a rhythm which belongs to me as it does to others: «vision is a thought 
subordinated to a certain field»49 and experiences «the communication of a fi-
nite subject with an opaque being from which it emerges but to which it re-
mains committed»50.
The theoretical line that is being traced here is that there is no self-con-
tained first person sphere, but rather a system involving others: the relationship 
between self and others is not founded on an analogizing apperception, based 
on which I form an apprehension of the other’s subjective life while placing 
myself, by means of the imagination, in her place (analogical inference model).
There is a certain sense in which Husserl himself considers solipsism as 
an abstraction, a residue of a primary global experience. In some manuscripts 
he in fact claims that there are two criteria which permit the establishment of 
the body’s own boundaries: 1) a criterion of a tactile nature, based on which the 
child realizes from a certain point onwards that the sensations present in her 
hand are not present in the other’s hand, and vice versa; 2) a kinesthetic type 
of criterion, linked to the experience of “I can” (my will allows me to move my 
body but not the other’s body). A very young child experiences her hands or feet 
visually as objects revolving in her visual field. Not even when the correlation 
between visual and tactile sensations enables her to grasp that those objects are 
parts of a feeling body, does she achieve a clear distinction between her own 
body and the other’s body. On the contrary, when the child notices those ob-
jects revolving in her visual field, her conclusion is that objects that look like 
these (the hands or feet of the other) can also be felt51.
Husserl considers this solution only as a hypothesis, but Merleau-Ponty 
consolidates it, regarding this over-extension of the living body’s constitution 
as the very foundation of subjectivity. A very young child makes no distinction 
between public and private, between internal and external experience. She pre-
47 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, cit., p. 243.
48 Ibi, p. 248.
49 Ibi, pp. 251-252. While also being central for Husserl, in Merleau-Ponty the notion of field 
takes on a profoundly different meaning: indeed, if for the former the field indicates the limits of 
possible variation, for Merleau-Ponty the field, as fabric of the world that constitutes us, has a more 
marked ontological valency.
50 Ibi, p. 254.
51 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Husserliana, vol. xiv, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1973 (1921-1928), p. 490.
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sumes that the other simply experiences the same sensations. This total origi-
nary absence of perspectival differentiation is crucial.
The other notion, which plays a complementary role to that of communi-
ty, is the notion of behavior. The notions of habit and behavior, associated with 
feeling understood as a motor process, become the standpoints for a profound 
revision of the notion, from which we started, of animated matter conceived no 
longer as an element separable from a total act but as a concretion of a global and 
integral experience. We are speaking of an experience which cannot be limited 
to conscious experience. In this sense, the (ontological) discussion of alterity is 
distinguished from the former (the epistemic), which shows how subjectivity 
and world may turn out to be deeply correlated, the world being one in which we 
live in common and not privately. If this latter thesis aims to show how «empa-
thy merely discloses an intersubjectivity already at work»52, the former aims to 
show how our life begins well before the moment in which our memory makes 
it begin. Furthermore, if it is true that, from an epistemic viewpoint, «it is cru-
cial to avoid conflating the alterity of the other and the alterity of the self, just as 
it is important to resist the temptation of assuming the distinction between self 
and other to be derivative and ultimately founded in a common anonymity»53, 
it is also true that, from an ontological viewpoint, the self is the result of an evo-
lutionary process of progressive specification starting from a common ground. 
Moreover, if the epistemic problem of intersubjectivity requires an analysis of 
the relationship between subjectivity and world («the three dimensions “self ”, 
“others”, and “world” belong together, they reciprocally illuminate one another, 
and can be fully understood only in their connection»54); the ontological prob-
lem of alterity focuses on the analysis of the relationship between subjectivity 
and matter and of that progressive process of differentiation and individuation, 
which gives rise to the constitution of a self.
If we adopt this perspective, what comes into play is not so much a solution 
to the (epistemic) problem of solipsism and alterity, as a solution to the (onto-
logical) problem of differentiation and individuation: i.e. of that «absurdity of 
a multiple solipsism»55 which philosophy is called on, helped by the sciences 
(especially the biological sciences), to decipher.
Roberta Lanfredini
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52 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, cit., p. 168.
53 Ibi, p. 175.
54 Ibi, p. 176.
55 Ibi, p. 418.
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Abstract
The aim of this study is to show how, in phenomenology, the relationship be-
tween solipsism and alterity is closely connected to the two concepts of matter and 
temporality. Openness to the Other has in fact two aspects: the first considers sen-
sation and a perceived property as being endowed with a motor physiognomy; the 
second consists in considering the past as prior to the present, or the now. The subjec-
tivity that emerges is temporal and to a large degree impersonal. In it the representa-
tional structure, or map-producing activity, is to a large degree reconfigured in favor 
of the motor and behavioral dimension. Similarly, focus on the essential character of 
subjectivity is progressively replaced by a search for processes of individuation starting 
from a common, inter-corporeal and integrated ontological dimension.
